El Alamein is regarded to be one of the significant turning points of the Second World War. Along with the Battle of Stalingrad in the Soviet Union and the Battle of Midway in the Pacific, it has all the features of a monumental shift in fortunes. On the one hand there is the once invincible Axis Army being halted, and then pushed backed decisively; whereas the tired Allied Army begins to re-group and then successfully counter-attack. How did this change in fortunes come about? Was El Alamein a stunning tactical master-piece, or was it an inevitable victory for the Allies - a foregone conclusion?
To answer this, one must address the wider strategic implications of the Desert War, the events preceding the final ‘clash of steel’ at El Alamein, supply and logistics problems, as well as the nature and personalities of the commanding officers.
The first point to be made is that there was no single battle of El Alamein, but rather a series of three confrontations. These battles have sometimes been given different names to help distinguish between them. The first ‘El Alamein’ has been called the Battle For Egypt[1] , the second ‘El Alamein’ is more often known as the Battle of Alam Halfa - after the desert ridge where it took place; whereas the third ‘El Alamein’ has always remained just ‘Alamein’ in the public’s imagination.
Ever since the British withdrawal from Dunkirk, and the Italian Army’s invasion of Egypt and British Somaliland in 1940, the Western Desert was to be the main theatre of war for the British for several years to follow. As part of the nature of desert warfare, spectacular advances were followed by grievous reverses. Indeed, the port of Benghazi had changed hands four times in two years. It was not until the massive Axis offensive of early 1942 did the Desert War reach a watershed.
When viewing the Second World War on a global scale, the fighting in the north western desert of Africa could be argued to be nothing more than a relatively unimportant theatre in comparison to the massive tank battles on the Eastern Front in Russia, or the vast naval clashes in the Pacific. However, was this really the case?
Originally the western desert was only brought into the war because the Italians under Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) desired conquests to match Hitler’s successes in Poland and Western Europe. Italy did not possess armed forces of a particularly high standard, and were only sufficiently well-trained to attack either poorly armed African troops or the tiny British garrisons in Egypt. To this end, over half of a million Italians were stationed in Libya and Abyssinia. Facing them in Egypt were a mere twenty thousand British and Commonwealth troops. However, under the leadership of Generals Archibald Wavell, Richard O’Connor and Lieutenant-general Cunningham - this small British army not only succeeded in liberating Abyssinia from Italian rule, but also almost conquered Libya - twice!
Had it not been for British Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s promise to send military assistance to Greece, and thereby denude the British forces in Africa - the Libyan capital of Tripoli would have likely been captured by the Allies as well. These victories did have a major morale impact during some of the darkest days for Britain during the War. In the resulting battles, nearly a quarter of a million Italians were captured, half the territory of Mussolini’s African Empire was liberated - and hundreds of Italian tanks were destroyed. North Africa was seen by many of the British commanders, especially Prime Minister Winston Churchill himself, as a possible launch pad to invading the German Reich through Italy and the Balkans; and thereby open a second front in Europe to ease the pressure on the Soviets in the East. Hitler saw this danger as well - and was not willing to let Italian incompetence endanger the southern flanks of Europe to an Allied attack. He also could not resist the opportunity to show Mussolini the superiority of German troops over their Italian allies. He therefore sent a small well-trained force of German motorised troops under General Erwin Rommel (1891-1944) to Africa to support the crumbling Italians. This army was initially called Panzer Gruppe Afrika, (later renamed Panzer Armee Afrika). Strictly speaking, Rommel only commanded the Deutches Afrika Korps (D.A.K. - the German component of the Panzer Army Afrika (PAA)), but his military genius soon outweighed Axis hierarchy.
The P.A.A. was the only Axis army in the Second World War to develop a clear identity for itself. The desert conditions bred a camaraderie between the troops on both sides that was not seen in other theatres of war. To many of the soldiers, the Desert War was a clean war. A ‘war without hate’ - the last to retain any vague notion of chivalry. Water holes were not poisoned, and each side treated prisoners of war humanely. There were few civilians in the north African desert, and also no German S.S.[2] troops. It could never be said that this was a friendly war. No war could ever be classed as friendly, but compared to the average conduct of other Second World War campaigns, the Desert War was certainly less savage - if no less bloody.
According to several sources, including the historian Niall Barr[3], the Axis High Command only intended Rommel to hold the British on the Italian border and thus equipped him so. The Deutsche Afrika Korps was only some 55,000 strong at its peak, which was quite insufficient (on paper at least) to conquer all of North Africa. As events transpired, Rommel succeeded in leading his army into British-held territories; forcing the Allies to retreat deeper and deeper into Egypt. Lack of modern weapons hampered the British troops’ ability to hold the Germans for long.
It was at this point that Churchill decided to sack the beleaguered but underrated General Wavell, and replace him with General Sir Claude Auchinleck (1884-1981), who immediately reformed the exhausted but defiant British Western Desert Force into the British 8th Army. This was achieved fairly rapidly, and soon they were able to launch a new offensive - Operation: Crusader.
Operation: Crusader was initially successful. Spearheaded by British ‘Crusader’ tanks, the Allied forces pushed the Germans and Italians back through the desert and into Libya once again. It was at Gazala that the two armies paused, both
equally far from their home bases in Tripoli and Alexandria. However, whilst the British and their Allies began to ‘dig-in’ – Rommel had decided to silently move his force around the British open flank to the South. At the resulting Battle of Gazala, Rommel was able to outflank the British and force them to retreat into Egypt farther than ever before. Even the famous symbol of British dogged resistance, the fortified port of Tobruk, fell to General Rommel after only a few days fighting in June 1942.
Following the fall of Tobruk, the British Western Desert commander General Auchinleck, sacked his leader of the British 8th Army – Lieutenant General Neil Ritchie (1897-1984), and took personal command himself. Auchinleck was very aware that the final defence of Egypt rested with him and the weakened British 8th Army. If Egypt was allowed to fall to the Germans, then the Suez Canal would be lost, cutting the shortest route from Britain to India – further weakening the Allied position in the Far East. The Middle East would fall soon after, and its oil reserves would be controlled by the Axis powers. On hearing about the fall of Tobruk, President Roosevelt of America ordered a large shipment of tanks and self-propelled guns to be sent to the 8th Army, enough to totally re-equip it. This he did without consulting Churchill first. However, the new supplies would not reach Auchinleck before Rommel’s attack was underway. Auchinleck’s slender forces in Egypt were also being reinforced by fresh British troops from Alexandria. The 8th Army was further strengthened by the 9th Australian Division from Syria, and the 4th Indian Division from Cyprus. These new forces filled the front line positions, allowing the tired retreating units to reorganise in the Allied rear. Disorganised Allied artillery and armoured units could now be concentrated into formidable defensive batteries as new Armoured brigades. With the 8th Army fatigued but intact, Auchinleck prepared for the final defence of Egypt.
General Auchinleck was well aware that the British under General Wavell and himself had twice pushed the Axis Forces back into Libya, only to be pushed back. He was therefore determined that this should not happen again. With supply of fuel and food a problem the further an army got from its home base[4], both Auchinleck and Rommel knew that rapid advances over the desert were not always as profitable as they appear – and retreating could often mean a strengthening of one’s position. With this knowledge known to him, Auchinleck hoped to stretch Rommel’s supply line by drawing the Germans closer to the British supply port of Alexandria, where the Allies’ burgeoning superiority in men and machines could be more effectively used. It would also allow Auchinleck to pre-select the ground on which to fight.
Auchinleck had decided to base the final defence of Egypt at El Alamein, a relatively unknown railway halt some 60 miles west of Alexandria. It was no accident that the crucial battle was to be fought here. The strategy of desert warfare previously rested upon the fact that there was always an open flank on the southern end of a front line, which could be circumvented relatively easily. This was not the case at El Alamein. Just 30 miles inland from the Mediterranean coast, there was a vast sunken sea of salt marshes and quick-sand; known as the Qattara Depression. To cross the Qattara Depression was difficult enough for the indigenous nomads, but impossible for mechanised armies. This all amounted to the inescapable fact that only a direct frontal attack would resolve the situation in Egypt. Essentially, it was the last defendable position before the Suez Canal.
The British lacked sufficient resources to be able to guard a continuous line stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to Qattara Depression, and Auchinleck was well aware of it. If he had tried to man such a thin formation, it would have been easily breached by a concentrated thrust by Rommel’s tanks, and then any ambush advantage given by the narrow El Alamein gap would have been lost. If Auchinleck wanted to stop the German’s he would have to think of something different.
What Auchinleck had decided to do was to concentrate his forces into several armed camps called ‘boxes’. This meant that he could mass his troops into the largest possible concentrations. This tactic did however mean that there were going to be gaps in the front, but Auchinleck was counting that Rommel would have to crush the ‘boxes’ in order to guarantee his advance. If Rommel had decided to ignore the ‘boxes’, then Auchinleck could have mounted wave after wave of raids into Rommel’s flanks, making the German position impossible. Rommel would have to pinch out the ‘boxes’ before advancing on Cairo.
It was crucial for the British Armoured Divisions to be strategically placed in order to plug any gaps that may be created following Rommel’s initial assault. The majority of Auchinleck’s forces were stationed in the largest box at ‘Alamein’ itself which lay along the coast. This was garrisoned by the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade and the 9th Australian Division. Below ‘Alamein’ rose the towering heights of the Ruweisat Ridge, which guarded the main route to Alexandria. Between ‘Alamein’ and Ruweisat, Auchinleck positioned two more South African divisions to stop a German breakthrough along the Miteirya pass.
At the exposed western end of the Ruweisat Ridge was the ‘Deir El Shein’ box, defended by the 18th Indian Infantry Brigade, and reinforced by the British 1st Armoured Brigade. Meanwhile the British 7th Armoured Brigade was sent far to the south, near to the small ‘Deir El Munassib’ box. The two Armoured Brigades had only 155 tanks between them.
Even further into desert lay the 6th New Zealand Brigade, guarding the ‘Bab El Qattara’ box. To the east of ‘Bab El Qattara’ were two more New Zealand brigades, whose task it was to act as a strategic reserve. Finally, there was the ‘Naqb Abu Dweis’ box on the very edge of the Qattara Depression itself, manned by the 9th Indian Infantry Brigade. Between these boxes, Auchinleck sent units of lorried infantry, armoured cars and mobile artillery to patrol any possible points of attack.
What of the Axis Forces? Rommel had only 64,000 men, 41 tanks and 71 guns when he reached the edge of the El Alamein defences. This consisted of three Italian divisions; the Ariete, Sabratha and Trieste. The German 90th Light Division of only 2000 men; and the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. His men had just fought over 400 miles in 36 days, and were badly over-stretched. Conventional military thinking would have advocated him halting his advance, digging-in and awaiting reinforcements. However, Rommel pushed his forces into attacking immediately.
On the 1st July 1942, without proper reconnaissance or preparation, Rommel plunged into the British position. He ordered the Sabratha and Trieste Division to hold the coast infront of the ‘Alamein’ box, and sent the Ariete Division to attack the New Zealanders at ‘Bab El Qattara’.
It was no chance that it was the Ariete Armoured Division that had been charged with clearing the New Zealanders, rather than the other Italian divisions. Before the ‘Bab El Qattara’ assault, the Ariete Division had been one of the few Italian forces to earn respect in the war, having not surrendered or retreated at the first sign of opposition, as had many other Italian regiments during the Desert War. With traditional Latin pomp, the Ariete Division set off for battle. However, it was not long before the New Zealanders, with bayonets and grenades, had routed the cream of the Italian Desert Army.
Meanwhile, the German 90th Light Division were ordered to bypass ‘Alamein’. Faulty logistics meant that they strayed too far north, and were struck by artillery fire from ‘Alamein’ as well as becoming embroiled in the British minefields there. Facing massed artillery bombardment and determined resistance of the Australian Division; the advance of the 90th Light Division was brought to a sudden and bloody halt. Rommel ordered a resumption of the attack the following day, but again the German’s ran into strong British positions, and on the 3rd, after more heavy fighting, Rommel called off the ‘Alamein’ offensive before he lost anymore troops there.
Rommel now turned his eyes further south. The smaller and lightly defended ‘Deir El Shein’ box was under siege by the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions. The Indian Division defending it were well-briefed, and began their tactical withdrawal before they were completely overrun. Spurred on by this apparent ‘success’, Rommel pushed his bruised Afrika Korps into one final push for a breakthrough on the 4th July. They came up against the British 1st Armoured Division and the survivors from ‘Deir El Shein’ on the Ruweisat Ridge. Neither side could gain the upper hand, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Rommel was now in a perilous position. At the end of a supply line which had been long stretched beyond breaking point. Rommel only had 37 tanks. His troops and equipment were exhausted, and could go no further, and withdrew to regroup.
The German attack at Ruweisat had stalled, and now it was the turn of the British. On the 10th July, a massive artillery bombardment from the ‘Alamein’ box decimated the Italian Sabratha and Trieste Divisions that were positioned along the coast. The 9th Australian Division then assaulted the dazed Italians, who turned and fled. General Von Mellenthin gathered a scratch force of rear area troops, HQ staff and even kitchen hands – and plugged the gap left by the Italians. However, Rommel still needed to send troops north to reinforce Von Mellenthin’s ‘gritty ragamuffins’ as one unknown British officer called them. This was all following Auchinleck’s plan. He had crushed Rommel’s weakest link – the Italians, and had therefore caused the Germans to spread their forces too thinly in the process.
On the 14th July, Auchinleck ordered his 400 tanks from ‘Alamein’ to attack Rommel’s 30 odd tanks along the Ruweisat Ridge. Just at the crucial stage of the battle, the British command broke down and the attack was poorly handled. Originally intended to be a night-time assault, the infantry advanced as planned and achieved their positions along the Ridge. However, their armoured support from the 22nd Division did not arrive until morning, by which time the Afrika Korps had counter-attacked and overrun the New Zealand infantry, who had to withdraw from Ruweisat.
Rommel was unable to capitalise on this breakthrough. His Afrika Korps was nearing total exhaustion, and could push no further. Their food was running out, as was their fuel supplies. This was the point Auchinleck had been waiting for. The final assault was about to begin!
On 21st July, the British, Imperial and Allied forces advanced on the Axis positions at ‘Deir El Shein’, and also attacked Von Mellethin’s Brigade along the coast, who was forced to withdraw. However, this second attack at ‘Deir El Shein’ was again very costly for the British. 87 Valentine tanks were destroyed or badly damaged. Rommel had laid mines and had used superior anti-tank gun tactics to ambush the 8th Army.
“One of the most common tactics was the use of well hidden and dug in anti-tank guns (a mixture of 50mm, 75mm and 88 mm pieces) which provided protection and cover for their tank forces. Whenever they met British tanks, the German tanks would try and draw them onto the hidden anti-tank screen. Time and again the tactic worked, and time and again, British tank crews found themselves knocked out by hidden anti-tank guns which they could not reply to. British tank crews always thought that German tanks were superior but this missed the point, it was German tactics which were superior.”[5]
The Second Assault on ‘Deir El Shein’ was a stalemate. The 8th Army had suffered 13,000 casualties since the beginning of July, and both sides could advance no further. Although not a clear military victory for the Allies, the First Battle of El Alamein was certainly a strategic victory. Rommel’s relentless march upon Cairo and Alexandria had been stopped, as planned. He would never again advance any further into Egypt.
There were, however, many in the British camp who did not believe that there had been a cohesive ‘First Battle’ of El Alamein at all, and that the British had won it even less so. Most notable among these were Field Marshal Harding and General Sir Charles Richardson. They felt that Auchinleck had simply responded to events, without providing cohesive leadership. Richardson wrote later that:
“At the time [July 1942] I certainly was quite unaware that we were ‘stabilising’. All I was aware of was a chaotic series of attacks scraped together, which to my mind at the time could scarcely have been said to have succeeded. My feeling at that time was that we were improvising reactions, and that this would continue until finally Rommel would put in a proper attack and that would be the end of it!”[6]
It was also evident that some in the British High Command in Cairo, including Admiral Andrew Cunningham, doubted Auchinleck’s ability to hold the Germans and Italians; and consequently the British Mediterranean Fleet had already fled from Alexandria to Beirut. To be fair to General Auchinleck, Rommel and his Afrika Korps ‘had’ been halted decisively at El Alamein. According to Bob Leach, in his book ‘Massacre At Alamein?’[7], this was as a direct result of a carefully constructed withdrawal by Auchinleck which involved drawing the Germans into the Alamein area. The halt in the German advance was partly due to their lack of fuel (which Auchinleck had anticipated), and also due to the dogged resistance of the British troops.
There is some doubt over the idea of Auchinleck deliberately allowing the Germans to push him back into Egypt, and allowing Tobruk to fall. Leach argues that Tobruk had little strategic value, and was not reinforced because it would not prove useful. However, if this was the case, why defend it at all? Why not just block the harbour with sunken wrecks and pull back to the Alamein line? Instead, Auchinleck lost thousands of Allied troops killed and captured in the defence of Tobruk, and suffered the humiliation of a defeat – rather than a tactical withdrawal with no loss of life. That is why this staged withdrawal, although popular among contemporary revisionist historians, does not “hold water” – except to prove Auchinleck as uncaring about his men. What is more likely is that Auchinleck intended to hold Tobruk, but lacked the resources (or the resolve) to carry this through.
However, the theory of a controlled tactical withdrawal is not without logic. It is open to question whether the Germans and Italians could have ever reached Alexandria (even with no British opposition). Exact details of Axis fuel levels is not known, but at least 3 out of every 4 supply ships from Italy were being sunk by the Royal Navy. This had to be seriously impacting upon Rommel’s fighting effectiveness. However, to base too much emphasis upon supply – and negate the role of the British 8th Army itself would show a basic lack of understanding of warfare in general. Even Harding and Richardson, who voiced dissatisfaction – never demean their own troops, but only the leadership in Cairo.
Had the incumbent commanders in the Desert lost the initiative? Both Churchill and Chief of Staff General Brooke believed that Auchinleck was certainly exhausted of any new ideas, hence Churchill’s comment:
“We need new leadership in the desert; otherwise we face a disaster!”[8]
Interviewed after the war, General Richardson has been quoted as referring to Auchinleck’s deputies, Generals Dorman-Smith and Corbett as “ignorant, incompetent buffoons.[9]” This could largely be attributed to Dorman-Smith’s insistence on making the 8th Army “flexible” in the face of the enemy. From studying contemporary records, Dorman-Smith suggested – and Auchinleck approved, the plan to break up the current brigades and divisions, slicing off portions of them to other regiments. According to General Richardson, this did little or nothing to improve the combat effectiveness of the 8th Army, but did succeed in lowering the troops’ morale still further – at a time when a soldier’s confidence was about all he had to rely upon. Such affection for one’s unit was almost unique during the Second World War for both sides in the Desert because of the environment of this campaign. In the heat of the desert, the 8th Army had built an “esprit de corps” not seen in any other theatre of war. Each man felt a special loyalty and belonging to his own unit or brigade. This had proved, sometimes, to be the only beacon in an otherwise dark time.
Churchill believed that it was not flexibility that was now needed in the desert, it was a fresh outlook on the campaign, and he had decided that Auchinleck was no longer up to the job. Was this a true reflection on the “Auk’s” abilities as a military commander? There are conflicting accounts of Auchinleck – the man and the general. Auchinleck, was a very tall man, over 6’4’’ and projected a grand presence both in person and in reputation. This was even admitted by his critics – Montgomery being the primary one of these. Among Auchinleck’s strongest admirers were his German enemies. Lt.-General Fritz Bayerlein (one of Rommel Staff chiefs) wrote:
“If Auchinleck had not been... the best Allied general in North Africa... Rommel would have finished the Eight Army off.” [10]
Auchinleck may well have been the best Allied General of the War in defence, but he had little proven experience in attack. His plan Operation: Crusader had ended in defeat at the Battle of Gazala. It will never be known what his success would have been in the future Desert offensive, but the verdict up to then can only be indecisive as to his offensive skills. Ultimately, the Allied High Command felt that he was obstinate and lacking the dynamism needed to command a modern army. It is certainly true that Auchinleck had halted Rommel at El Alamein, but at very high cost. The 8th Army was in no position to resume the attack for at least a month, possibly longer. Meanwhile, Auchinleck had ordered Major-General (later Field Marshal) John Harding to begin drafting a plan for the possible withdrawal of the 8th Army from Egypt, with half of the forces retreating into the Middle East based around Basra, and the remainder pulling back along the Nile Valley to Khartoum in the Sudan. Although quite necessary to plan for all contingencies, news of the possible withdrawal was leaked and morale took a further blow.
However, the primary leak of this plan came from General Bernard Montgomery, Auchinleck’s final replacement as Commander of the 8th Army. At the time of the change over, Montgomery asked Auchinleck what his contingency plans were. Auchinleck also had attack plans devised – but Montgomery never mentioned these to the press, ‘apparently’ wanting to show his predecessor in a negative light. He declared that “The bad old days are over!”[11] This act can be seen as an attempt to reject all that had gone before himself as defeat and disaster, and only ‘he’ Montgomery could avert a further crisis.
Part of the reason that Auchinleck had to prepare for a withdrawal further back into Egypt was to counter a possible rebellion by the pro-German Egyptian Army. Only by stationing further troops in Cairo, including sending a group of tanks into King Farouk’s palace could the British stem the unrest.
Churchill wanted a quick victory to raise the morale of the British people, and to coincide with the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa as part of ‘Operation: Torch’. Auchinleck stubbornly refused to order another assault until the promised three hundred American tanks arrived and his men had had time to recover from their recent bruising battle. The earliest he would agree to was the 9th September.
It was this supposed lack of ‘fighting spirit’ as Churchill viewed it that sealed Auchinleck’s fate. He was sacked in August 1942, and was replaced by General Harold Alexander (1891-1969), the debonair Irish aristocrat, as overall Commander in Chief of the Middle East. This was only after General Alan Brooke had already declined the post, feeling that he was best placed to curb some of Churchill’s more romantic military decisions before they could be put into motion back in London.
Originally intended to replace Auchinleck as 8th Army commander was the forty three year old General W.H.E. ‘Strafer’ Gott. Gott was experienced in the Desert, well liked by his men, and privy to Auchinleck’s plans. As head of the Desert Rats (the 7th Armoured Brigade), he was the obvious choice.
Gott was however mentally and physically exhausted after two years fighting in the desert without leave. He was picked from among a short-list of four, who also included General Bernard Montgomery (1887-1976); General M. Wilson; and Auchinleck’s own choice, fellow Indian Army officer General T. Corbett. Corbett was immediately rejected by Churchill and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) Alan Brooke because of his poor record of command in Cairo. Wilson was also rejected, but for no specific reason other than Churchill’s personal hunch, and Montgomery was put in charge of the British forces in ‘Operation: Torch’.
On route to Cairo, General Gott’s plane was shot down and he was killed. This tragedy put a new light on the command situation in Cairo. Montgomery was now the first choice, and was duly summoned. This meant that Churchill had removed the proposed British commander from ‘Operation: Torch’. This made General Eisenhower, the USA Commander in Chief, suspicious that the British held the Western Desert campaign in higher importance than the East African landings. To be fair, this was probably true when the larger strategic picture is taken into account. The Western Desert defended the Suez Canal and the Middle East, whereas the French colonies in North Eastern Africa held little strategic value, and were merely being invaded to perform one half of the pincer movement to trap the Axis forces in North Africa.
Now in command of the 8th Army, Montgomery set about reorganising his ‘brave but baffled’ ‘civilians in uniform’ into his own British Afrika Korps. Montgomery met Harding in Cairo, and it was Harding who had pencilled in the plans for the B.A.K. as a strike force that could overturn Rommel’s forces. Harding’s force consisted of four divisions, as opposed to the usual three. This British Afrika Korps would consist of the First Armoured Division, the Eighth Armoured Division, the Tenth Armoured Division and finally the New Zealand Division. Of these, only the New Zealanders were actually at the front at El Alamein; and were the only division who could field two infantry brigades as well as one armoured brigade.
These plans were delayed for nearly a week because Auchinleck had refused to step down as leader until his official dismissal date of 15th August, days after Montgomery and Alexander had arrived in Cairo. On the one hand this could be seen as obstinance by Auchinleck, but also over-eagerness by Montgomery in what was still considered a gentlemanly system. Only when Auchinleck had gone could the mammoth task of reorganising the 8th Army truly begin, and then it could not be done ‘overnight’.
Montgomery, at last given command of a battle-field army, was revelling in the forthcoming challenge. Montgomery was a very charismatic man, and although egotistical and frequently conceited about his own abilities. He soon impressed his personality upon the 8th Army. Within weeks of his appointment the 8th Army was apparently brimming with confidence and eager to resume battle – not for the love of fighting, but to end the war in the desert sooner rather than later. Montgomery travelled around all the formations, declaring that there would be: “No more Retreats!”
Montgomery realised that the way to defeat the Germans was to develop a British version of the German ‘Blitzkrieg’ warfare. This depended greatly upon close co-operation between the ground forces and the Royal Air Force. The chief of the Desert Air Force, Air Marshal Tedder, pledged to work closely with Montgomery. Air Intelligence was of particular use to Montgomery. The British had clear air superiority, and were able to spy upon German manoeuvres. Brad Gladman argues in his article “Air Power and Intelligence in the Western Desert Campaign 1940-43”[12] that RAF intelligence leading to land-based interdiction of Axis supplies was of greater use to the British command than was ULTRA (the Allies’ ability to crack the German Enigma ciphers), which mainly led to the Royal Navy intercepting Rommel’s supplies at sea. Either way, it was the net result that mattered most – and this result was that the Axis forces faced serious shortages as the fighting loomed. ULTRA did, however, forewarn Montgomery that Rommel was building up supplies and reinforcements for a final attempt to push through El Alamein and capture Alexandria and the Suez Canal.
These reinforcements included the 164th Infantry Division and four brigades of paratroops under Brigadier Bernhard Ramcke. However, these extra troops would be little use to Rommel however if his supplies from Italy could not get through. Only a quarter of the supply ships were getting past the RAF based in Malta, and then the convoys had to make the perilous journey across the desert from Tripoli to the front line in Egypt. Six thousand tons of fuel were needed, but only one thousand tons had reached Rommel by the start of the fighting. This effectively meant that Rommel and the Afrika Korps could not reach Alexandria even if they were victorious at Alamein.
As mentioned earlier, intelligence was crucial to the outcome of the battle. Research at the Public Records Office uncovered information concerning the role of the British Private Armies – better known as the Special Air Service and Long Range Desert Group (hereinafter referred to as the SAS and LRDG) in the North Western Desert campaigns. Originally the SAS and the LRDG were part of the same special forces unit, formed to infiltrate the Axis lines for spying and sabotage operations. By late 1942 the need had arisen for the two to be divided into separate organisations. From Report No.144 concerning Special Forces’ operations of October 24th 1942 to January 23rd 1943[13], which reported upon the need to “increase the size and scope of the SAS regiment, and define the respective roles of the SAS and the LRDG.”
Perhaps the most important area of intelligence was the Royal Air Force’s air reconnaissance operations. Interdiction of the enemy supply lines was crucial to defeating them in battle, and the RAF played the prime role in preventing Rommel’s supplies from reaching the front. Random bombing would be of no use, as they would have to cover over 200,000 square miles to find a handful of convoys. Therefore air photography, pilot eye witnesses, interrogation of prisoners of war, and interception of enemy signals all played their part. In the period before the first battle of El Alamein, the RAF’s bombing campaign was intercepting over a thousand German transport vehicles in the Bir Hacheim area alone. The comparative rigidity of the El Alamein front (due to the impassable Qattara Depression) allowed the RAF to use its permanent air fields and improve upon their air reconnaissance operations. During the battle, the constant bombing by the RAF caused such a fuel crisis among the Axis forces that Rommel had to redeploy his forces in order to conserve petrol. It particularly hampered him making a counter-attack, and ultimately cost him the battle.
The American supplies to the 8th Army effectively altered the balance of power in North Africa, and Montgomery put them to good use. He realised that German anti-tank weapons and tactics were superior, and so he decided to try a new tactic of his own. Montgomery ordered the tanks of the 8th Army and the men of the recently arrived 44th Infantry Division to dig-in on the north end of the Alam Halfa Ridge, which ran east-west twelve miles behind the British front line, rather than to advance on the German positions. Montgomery would not countenance retreat, but he was prepared to allow the enemy to enter his lines, so long as it was part of a trap.
The German attack was expected during the next full moon – the 26th August, but it never materialised, and Montgomery’s commanders General Horrocks and General de Guingand used the breathing space to develop a deception plan to fool the Germans. The plan went as follows: planted in a burnt out British armoured car in the desert, a highly detailed but false map of the British minefields was left for the Germans to find. This map had been devised by British Intelligence to lure the Germans into attacking the British flank in the south. Rommel believed from the map that the minefields in the south were thin and poorly defended. In fact the southern minefields were extensive – and to make matters worse the sands in that area were especially soft. As planned, the Germans discovered the map, and believed it. Using this misinformation, the Germans prepared to attack south of the main British force, or so they thought.
Rommel ordered diversionary attacks against the northern defences of the British front line with mainly Italian troops, and then sent the bulk of his army – the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, the 90th Light and the Italian 20th Corps (reformed in part from the shattered remnants of the Sabratha and Trieste Divisions) inland towards the southern end of Alam Halfa. What Rommel had planned was to try and outflank the British defences by a wide sweep along the edge of the Qattara Depression – where he believed the minefields were few and far between. Once through the minefields he could cut off the British from the rear and leave the way clear to advance on Alexandria. In doing so, he was driving straight into the trap that Montgomery had laid for him.
The British position rested on the massed motorised strength of the 7th and 10th Armoured Divisions (part of the 13th Corps). This was the so-called British Afrika Korps, commanded by Montgomery’s old deputy from England, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks. These protected the flanks of the Alam Halfa position, which was itself held by Imperial troops.
The Imperial troops (Australians, New Zealanders, South Africans, Rhodesians and Indians) were stationed in a series of strongholds interconnected with minefields. This was similar to the tactics used by Auchinleck in the first battle of El Alamein. Whilst Rommel would be bogged down in the south, the British and Allies in the north could attack the Germans from the exposed northern salient, and hopefully cause the Germans to run out of fuel, leaving them ‘sitting ducks.’
In the first few minutes of the 31st August 1942, Rommel ordered his forces to advance upon the southern British positions. Avoiding their own minefields, the troops of the Afrika Korps suddenly found themselves engulfed in British mines. Soon, not only were the Germans and Italians being destroyed from underfoot, but the British artillery knew exactly where to strike as well. Finally, the British Desert Air Force joined in the attack. Soon the Afrika Korps were being mauled from all sides. Even Rommel’s senior staff officers were being killed or seriously wounded, among them General Georg von Bismarck and General Walther Nehring. Rommel himself estimated that for every shot fired by the Germans, the British replied with ten.
Air power was all important in the Desert War, where ground cover was virtually non-existent. For over a year the Royal Air Force had complete air superiority over the Luftwaffe, and this meant that Rommel’s attack was doomed – even if the British deception plan is discounted.
As the summer dawn lit up the battlefield, the shattered German and Italians fell headlong into the heavy defences of the British Armoured Divisions further to the north. This was the decisive clash between the Afrika Korps of Germany and Britain. With any element of surprise long since vanished, Rommel began to despair for the situation. To add a final death-nail to the German cause, larger sandstorms blew up in their rear, hindering the movement of Rommel’s supplies and reserves.
Rommel’s fuel, even if it had ever been delivered from Italy, could not have got through to the front. The RAF was simply too dominant. The German tanks had almost run out of petrol, and could not move far from where they had been halted. For the next two days they dug-in to the south of the British forces, and slowly attempted to push northwards with not much more than petrol vapours in their engines. By the evening of the 2nd September, Rommel only had enough fuel in total for his troops to retreat to their base camps at Bab El Qattara (some 30 miles away), or face being stranded in the desert. He had no choice but to withdraw, still under heavy fire from the British guns. Montgomery also ordered the New Zealand Division to plug the gap in the south, and to further harry Rommel’s retreat.
The Germans and Italians had lost nearly 3000 troops, over 50 tanks, 400 lorries and nearly 100 artillery pieces. Montgomery had suffered only half the number of casualties as Rommel, but had lost 67 tanks.[14] The British could however better afford the vehicle losses. By the 6th September, Rommel’s withdrawal was complete. For General Montgomery, it was the start of his great push through Africa. The great push that Auchinleck had planned for, but had not been given the chance to put into action. Within days of taking over command of the ‘brave but baffled’ 8th Army Montgomery had crushed Rommel in a major battle, and restored British prestige. However, could Auchinleck have been able to achieve the same?
Rommel’s staff officer, Von Mellenthin describe the Battle of Alam Halfa as ‘the turning point in the Desert War... first in a long series of defeats on every front which foreshadowed the defeat of Germany.’[15]
It was not Auchinleck’s victory that was mentioned, but Montgomery’s. Montgomery had achieved what Auchinleck had not – a decisive victory in the field. That victory was, however, based upon Auchinleck’s own plan. So was Rommel doomed from the outset? He was already chronically short on fuel, and after his reversal at Alam Halfa, Rommel was no longer able to take to the offensive against the British front line. He could not even hope to match the British in weight of numbers anymore. However, Rommel’s largest handicap was his supply line. The British planes, operating from their bases along the Nile in Egypt, held complete air superiority. This was due to the majority of German Luftwaffe’s planes having been switched to the Russian Front.
Rommel’s supplies had to cross over one thousand four hundred miles of open desert from their port at Tripoli to the front line. Montgomery, by contrast, was only sixty miles from his supply point of Alexandria. It was because of his inability to mount an attack that Rommel ordered the construction of a strong defensive line along the Alamein position, west of the Alam Halfa and Rusweisat Ridges.
The Axis Forces simply did not have enough men or tanks to defend the entire front. There were fifty thousand Germans and fifty four thousand Italians. Almost two hundred and fifty armoured vehicles and over a thousand guns – but under one hundred of the powerful German 88mm Gun; and several hundred aircraft (including obsolete bi-planes). Consequently the majority of the front line consisted of minefields. Over half-a-million mines had been laid in zones five miles deep, called the Devil’s Garden.
Montgomery and the other British commanders knew that the German defences stretched from the sea to the impassable Qattara Depression, and consequently there could be no outflanking manoeuvre. The only way to attack was straight through the main German lines!
The ‘Devil’s Garden’ was centred around three heavily defended desert ridges. In the north were the Miteirya and Kidney ridges (the latter named because of its shape on contour maps), with the minefields stretching south and east towards the Rusweisat ridge. Forewarned by ULTRA Montgomery knew of Rommel’s shortages in fuel and men – and even of Rommel’s weakening health from jaundice – which necessitated his return to Germany. When Rommel had departed, Montgomery knew the time to attack had finally arrived.
For the Battle of Egypt, Montgomery had assembled over a quarter of a million troops. British, Australian, New Zealanders, Indians, South Africans, Greeks, Poles, Czechs and Free French – more than twice the number of troops that Rommel had at his disposal. He also had more than one thousand tanks (of which four hundred and twenty two were the new American Shermans and Lee-Grants). Over two thousand guns and exactly five hundred and thirty serviceable aircraft.[16]
Montgomery had reconciled himself to a “horrid bloody killing match. A First World War battle fought with Second World War technology.”
Was this inevitable? If Montgomery had chosen to attack before the Devil’s Garden was in place – then the natural dynamic of desert warfare should have meant that a trench warfare-style attack into heavily defended positions was not necessary. Under Montgomery’s cautious command, the Germans had been able to construct the massive mine fields, and consequently the Battle for Egypt would be nothing less than a battle of attrition.
Montgomery had planned the Second Battle of El Alamein to be in two phases. First would be Operation: Lightfoot. The British 30th Division (consisting of the 51st Highlanders, Australian, New Zealanders, Indians, South Africans and British Armoured Brigades), under the command of Major General Oliver Leese would attack the Miteirya Ridge in the north. Leese would be reinforced by Major General Herbert Lumsden and his X Corps, who would punch through the weakened German defences – as part of Operation: Supercharge (the second assault).
In the south, Major General Brian Horrock’s 13th Corps (including the famous 7th Armoured Division ‘The Desert Rats’ with Greek, Polish, Czech and French support) would create a massive diversion in the south. Bob Leach in his book ‘Massacre At Alamein?’, argues that the diversionary troops should have made the main thrust – whereas the troops to the North were walking straight into the heavy German defences. A southern attack was, however, the traditional tactic employed by the British during this period of the Desert War. Attack from the south towards the coast using armoured divisions to drive the Axis troops literally into the sea. Rommel knew this as much as Montgomery, and so the British commander decided to use exactly the opposite approach for the forthcoming battle. That is why the British and Allied troops attacked from the north, using infantry and artillery rather than tanks. Leach argues it was simply Montgomery wanting to appear to act different to Auchinleck, and so win all the credit for the victory:
“At a secret meeting...... Auchinleck was asked by Montgomery about his plan of attack and also about contingency plans in case of withdrawal. There had been doubt in Auchinleck’s mind that if the conditions did not change then there was no way he could lose the Battle of Alamein. Contingency plans were necessary, however, just in case conditions did change..... It was normal military strategy. It was common sense. Montgomery, however, never talked of Auchinleck’s plan of attack, but superciliously never missed an opportunity to declare that ‘he would never retreat to the Delta!’.... suggested that had Auchinleck still been in charge there would have been a withdrawal.”[17]
For the battle plan to work, he needed the Germans to believe that the attack would come from the south as assumed. For this task Montgomery appointed Major Charles Richardson, who was to head Operation: Bertram as this massive decoy plan was code named.
Richardson idea was to build a fake pipeline in the south, constructed slowly so that Axis intelligence would assume a November rather than October attack. False radio traffic encouraged the Germans to believe that the British Armour was regrouping in the south, and with the construction of a fake railway in this area confirmed the plan for the German High Command. Richardson’s masterstroke came when the Allies built an entire phoney army base in the south, complete with phoney guns, ammunition dumps, reservoirs, cardboard soldiers with tin hats and even inflatable tanks!
The Axis Commanders, lacking any air reconnaissance due to the Allied air superiority – took this southern threat seriously, and consequently stationed over half of their entire strength to face it. Meanwhile, Montgomery was constructing his real military base camp in the north, cleverly camouflaged so as not to attract attention. It was at this time that Rommel, sick with jaundice and hypertension, was invalided in Germany. The scene was now set for the beginning of the British offensive.
The battle began suddenly at 9.40pm on the 23rd October. A thousand British guns opened fire on the German lines. As the bombardment was underway, the British tanks began their advance; as did the infantry. Ahead of the advancing troops, Montgomery sent teams of sappers to clear a path through the German minefields as part of the aptly named Operation: Lightfoot.
Two exiled Free Polish officers had developed a new electronic mine detector, and a consignment of these had been hurriedly despatched to the desert. However, on arrival, many of the detectors were discovered to be faulty. This meant that the British soldiers had to search for the mines by prodding the sand with their bayonets. After an agonising wait, the sappers marked their safe path with fluorescent tape for the troops to follow. It was Montgomery’s command style to make sure that every single man in his Eighth Army knew exactly what he had to do. Each had his own objective to achieve – his own target to accomplish. Montgomery was possibly the most meticulous and organised of any commander of any army in the Second World War.
The Allied soldiers advanced behind the creeping barrage. It was the 51st Highlanders who spearheaded the first infantry assault. In fact, they reached their objective on central Kidney Ridge too early, and were hit by both German and British shells. To compound their predicament, their armoured support (30th Corps) had not reached its objective of securing the Highlanders’ rear. This was due to it being bogged down in the minefields of the Devil’s Garden. Although the British engineers (sappers) had cleared safe paths through the minefields, these could now be targeted by the German artillery, and soon the few safe routes were clogged with wrecked tanks.
Montgomery’s plan was now beginning to look supreme folly. Any advantage that the British and Commonwealth forces had from the bombardment and greater numbers had been lost by the decision to squeeze the huge Allied army into the narrow paths through the mine fields. If something was not done soon – the inevitable British victory was going to turn into defeat.
The British Engineers hastily brought up their ‘Scorpion’ and ‘Barons’ tanks. These were specially modified Matilda tanks. Matilda’s were the main battle tank for the British from their early days in the desert – but they were now slow and obsolete in the face of German anti-tank guns. However, equipped with flails and chains, they were perfect for clearing anti-personnel mines safely and quickly. This they did, and 30th Corps armour could move forward and support the embattled Highlanders. The battle raged for the next two days. On the 25th October, X Corps under General Lumsden became bogged down in the Devil’s Garden and was under fire from German artillery. With his troops under attack from all directions, Lumsden began to lose confidence in Montgomery’s plan. He was therefore summoned to the field head quarters for a brief meeting, with 30th Corps’ General Leese in attendance. Montgomery later remarked:
‘A certain infirmity of purpose appeared in the mind of X Corps commander, and he was beginning to think that my plan was not on. I told him that I alone was commanding the theatre. I have often thought that if I had weakened at that moment we might have lost the battle.’[18]
General Lumsden was cowed, and returned to his command to continue with the agreed offensive. Montgomery continued with his plan, despite the heavy losses. Meanwhile, the South Africans were unable to relieve the New Zealanders at Miteirya because of renewed German resistance. While this was happening in the North, the British 13th Corps had been charged with the task of staging a huge diversion in the South near Rusweisat Ridge to tie down the large Italian Ariete Division from reinforcing the German Armour further to the north.
On the 26th, Rommel returned to the desert – although still suffering from jaundice; and ordered a counter-attack; furious that his Panzers had not done so while the British were bogged down in the minefield. However, with his deputy Stumme dead, and his forces scattered and outnumbered – it was too little too late. Rommel’s concentrated attack was smashed by Air Marshal Tedder’s Desert Air Force. Whose 1200 aircraft outnumbered the German Luftwaffe by a ratio of three to one. With his armies destroyed from the air, Rommel had no choice but begin a withdrawal.
After the Battles of El Alamein, there was no doubt about who the eventual victors in the Desert would be. The Allies now enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority in men, equipment and resources. It was only a matter of time before the Germans were pushed out of Africa for good. However, were the Battles of El Alamein foregone conclusions before they even started? The crux of this argument is that the Axis Forces had insufficient men, fuel and equipment to be able to ever defeat the Allies in Egypt and capture the symbolic port of Alexandria. Historians Niall Barr and Fred Majdalany believed that Rommel’s assault upon Egypt was doomed from the outset, and that the Battles of El Alamein were indeed inevitable Allied victories.
What Barr[19] suggests is that the Afrika Korps were still compelled to use Tripoli in Libya as their main supply port. This was because of the lack of suitable ports nearer to the front line. Tobruk and Benghazi were too small, and under constant British air attack. There was also a need to keep the journey by sea from Italy to a minimum as the majority of the Mediterranean Sea was dominated by the Royal Navy. Essentially, Barr argues that Rommel was too ambitious in his attack East. He saw a chance to sweep the British out of Egypt; and being a bold taker of risks, he could not resist the challenge, although his lack of resources would ultimately frustrate his plans.
All of the fuel, ammunition and food that the Germans and Italians needed had to be imported from Italy. As there were no operational ports nearer to the front than Tripoli, Rommel’s supply conveys had to cover 1500 miles of open desert. Even the capture of British supplies could not alleviate the Axis Force’s plight.
“Instead of fulfilling his dull but realistic defence mission, Rommel immediately attacked with his small force in spring 1941. Rommel never grasped the concept that without supply, he could never capture Egypt. His supply situation was such that he could never reach Alexandria. The only reason he had pushed as far as Alamein was because of the ‘outflanking’ manoeuvre. The Qattara depression prevented this. The British were now too concentrated near their home bases to be overpowered.”[20]
This argument, however, does have some flaws within its reasoning. The counter argument is made by the contemporary accounts of the time. Special Forces reports confirmed Rommel’s strength to the British[21]. Although severely stretched, the Axis forces had sufficient men and resources to defeat the Allies and take Egypt. If Rommel had defeated Auchinleck at the first El Alamein (which had been a real possibility), then Egypt would have been overrun. This was certainly the feeling in Cairo. Rommel had just enough fuel to reach the British supplies in Alexandria if his troops could have made a straight run for them, and not been embroiled at El Alamein. None-the-less, the Royal Navy had fled Alexandria for Beirut.
Although it is true that Rommel’s primary task was to stop an Italian collapse, and not take to the offensive himself, his victories were surely welcomed and encouraged in Berlin. Germany needed a hero, and Rommel was made into that by Goebbels – the German propaganda minister.
“The bold, opportunistic Field Marshal managed to persuade two other opportunists , Hitler and Mussolini, that a bold advance now would seal the fate of the British in Egypt. With Hitler’s approval, Rommel could ignore his nominal Italian C. In C. Marshal Cavallero and the German commander of the Mediterranean Albert Kesselring.”[22]
The Germans also had other advantages. German divisions were kept in the Desert, not rotated home. British troops on the other hand had leave, usually to the bright lights in Cairo. For the Germans, this meant that they gained far more experience than equivalent British troops. Men of the 15th and 12th Panzer armies became hardened veterans; although they also became exhausted through constant fighting. The Germans also demanded that their weapons be made to suit their purposes, whereas the British had to make do with the standard equipment sent. German manufacturers built high quality precision weapons, but were few in number. To say that skill and fortitude by the Allies was unnecessary because of their larger numbers is to belittle their efforts. An army of a million men could be destroyed by an army of one man with a million bullets that all hit their mark. Equally, even if the Germans could match the Allies in terms of numbers, without supplies for their troops getting to the front – any number of men and machines would have been useless. The Allies were fortunate to have the larger forces at a time when this could be exploited – i.e. when they were close to their supply port of Alexandria. Also, with no air cover or re-supply by sea, even a far larger force of Axis troops could not have held out for much longer.
What the battles of El Alamein show is that a myriad of different factors were involved in the course of the eventual outcome, not just numbers. For one, leadership was a crucial aspect. Rommel was daring and impetuous; Auchinleck was cautious but open to suggestions; while Montgomery was methodical and meticulous. However, no matter how good the leader – without bullets, men or fuel, it is nothing. Although the Allies were victorious in the Battles of El Alamein, the nature of each of the battles were very different. Essentially the first was defensive; the second (Alam Halfa – although orchestrated by Montgomery), was actually a completion of Auchinleck’s first battle rather than the overture to the third battle[23], which was very much an offensive. This dynamic meant that both sides had the opportunity to exploit the advantages of defence and attack – and in both cases the Allies proved the superior.
From the start of the war in the Desert, the balance had increasingly swung towards the Allies, whilst Axis power waned. The British had more tanks, better intelligence, more supplies, more favourable – if a rotating leadership until the final Alexander / Montgomery team were appointed. Finally, the absence of Rommels’ genius at the start of the third battle was probably as crucial to the outcome of the fighting as another hundred German tanks would have been; although this could never be proved beyond speculation. Rommel did lack a convenient supply port, and his plan also relied heavily upon Italian support, which was not forthcoming for the most part. The Allies also had domination of the seas and the skies of the Mediterranean.
In the final analysis, no battle is a foregone conclusion. There is too much revisionism in history where great men of the past are undone and belittled. Both Auchinleck and Montgomery were great generals. They needed to lead their troops and organise their resources – successfully – against probably the only ‘genius’ General of the Second World War, Erwin Rommel. All battles can be lost, or become pyrrhic victories. The heavy casualties on both sides during the Alamein Trilogy would have paralysed smaller countries, but were sustainable only through monumental efforts. In the end, the Allies, with their larger forces and better supplies, were ‘likely’ victors. Even during the great offensive of October and November 1942, the fate of the Western Desert War still hung in the balance.
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